The revision of House of Representatives (DPR) Regulation No. 1 of 2020 on the DPR’s Rules of Procedure, which essentially strengthens the DPR’s supervisory authority over candidates for public office whose appointments are subject to political approval by the DPR—such as Constitutional Court Justices, Supreme Court Justices, leaders of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), commissioners of other state institutions, as well as the Governor and Board of Governors of Bank Indonesia—constitutes a misguided intervention into the principle of checks and balances within Indonesia’s constitutional system. Although the revised regulation does not explicitly mention the removal of public officials, the wording of Article 228A paragraph (2) states that the results of the evaluation are binding, which could ultimately lead to dismissal if the evaluation recommends the removal of a state official.
The substance of Article 228A is formally flawed because an internal regulation of a state institution should only govern the institution’s internal affairs and/or regulate parties directly associated with that institution. Substantively, the provision also contradicts the principle of popular sovereignty as enshrined in Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states that “Sovereignty rests with the people and shall be exercised in accordance with the Constitution.” The phrase “in accordance with the Constitution” is intended to safeguard the autonomy and independence of constitutional institutions, ensure a proper system of checks and balances among the branches of government, and prevent the enactment of regulations that would substantially undermine the independence of state institutions established either by the Constitution or by statute. Furthermore, Article 228A effectively overrides numerous sectoral laws that explicitly guarantee the independence of institutions such as the Supreme Court (MA), the Constitutional Court (MK), Bank Indonesia (BI), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Judicial Commission (KY), and others, all of which risk having their independence curtailed through the DPR’s excessive and unreasonable evaluation authority.
The DPR has failed to understand the meaning of its oversight function, as provided in Article 20A paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The oversight function vested in the DPR is intended to monitor how other branches of government implement legislation. In other words, the DPR’s oversight extends to the implementation of laws—not to evaluating the personal performance of individual officeholders, particularly in cases that often involve multiple layers of conflicts of interest. Within a presidential system, the DPR’s authority to approve nominations, elect, or confirm certain public officials exists solely to ensure checks and balances among state institutions and to limit the President’s discretion in appointing public officials who exercise state authority, thereby preserving the institutional independence envisioned by the constitutional framework.
Parliamentary supremacy that exceeds the constitutional principle of the separation of powers under Article 1 paragraph (2) of the Constitution must not be allowed to stand. The DPR should instead concentrate on its core constitutional responsibilities: enacting legislation, overseeing the implementation of the laws it has enacted, and exercising its budgeting function more effectively and responsibly. Rather than creating political and institutional traps that serve partisan interests, compel unquestioning compliance with Parliament, and create opportunities for political bargaining and negotiation, the DPR should strengthen the quality of its constitutional functions. This DPR Regulation, which is defective both procedurally and substantively, should not be promulgated. If it has already been enacted, it should be challenged before the Supreme Court so that it may be promptly annulled.
HENDARDI,
Chairperson of the National Board SETARA Institute