Two crucial issues have emerged amid the push to accelerate police reform: the proposal for the President to directly appoint the National Police Chief, and the clarification that police officers may hold civilian positions without being subject to retirement requirements. Both reflect the fundamental need to ensure that police governance is more professional, transparent, and subject to democratic oversight.
First, amid public demands for transparency in law enforcement and greater integrity among officials, the mechanism for appointing the National Police Chief plays a strategic role in determining the direction of institutional change. The debate over the possibility of the President directly appointing the National Police Chief without the approval of the House of Representatives has provided an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the current process.
Second, following Constitutional Court Decision No. 114/PUU-XXIII/2025, which stated that the phrase “or not based on an assignment from the National Police Chief” in the Explanatory Notes to Article 28, paragraph (3) of Law No. 2 of 2002 had caused confusion and broadened the scope of the provision in question, as well as created legal uncertainty—a situation that is prohibited under Article 28D, paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The National Police Chief issued a response through National Police Regulation No. 10 of 2025, which stipulates the positions in 17 ministries and civilian agencies that may be held by members of the National Police.
In light of this situation, the SETARA Institute offers the following observations:
1. The proposal and/or suggestion that the President appoint the National Police Chief without the approval of the House of Representatives has two sides. On the one hand, this arrangement could result in a closed appointment process, cementing sole authority in the hands of the President, and could potentially increase the risk of politicizing the National Police if the appointed Chief is perceived as being too politically close to the President. On the other hand, this proposal avoids political tug-of-war in the House of Representatives, eliminates the space for political negotiations that often create political debts to specific members of the House or certain factions, and ensures that the selected National Police Chief is truly aligned with the President’s vision.
2. The implementation of this proposal requires strict regulations. For instance, first, there must be a commitment to ensuring transparency and accountability in the President’s appointment process, including the publication of candidates’ track records, the internal selection process, competency indicators, and the President’s rationale for selecting a particular candidate. Second, the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) must be involved to ensure the objectivity, integrity, and professionalism of the selection process. Kompolnas’ involvement should not be merely as a standard recommendation-giver, but as an independent gatekeeper ensuring that every candidate for National Police Chief meets ethical standards and strategic competency requirements. Third, strengthening the House of Representatives’ oversight function with a focus on the National Police Chief’s performance after taking office, including the potential for recommendations for dismissal in the event of serious violations. This performance-based oversight is expected to be more substantive than a mere formal fitness-for-duty test. And fourth, opening up opportunities for public consultation to hear various inputs from experts and the public.
3. With regard to Constitutional Court Decision No. 114/PUU-XXIII/2025, this decision can play a significant role in the reform of the Indonesian National Police (Polri). Through this decision, the potential use of the relevant phrase as justification for expanding the deployment of Polri members outside the Polri institution can be halted. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning has addressed a substantial issue regarding the impact of this phrase, namely that it has obscured the meaning of the phrase “after resigning or retiring from police service” in Article 28(3) of the National Police Law. This decision can serve as a corrective force for the government and a mirror for the National Police to accelerate the consolidation of police reform.
4. Regarding the 17 ministries and agencies that members of the National Police may hold positions in without a retirement mechanism, as stipulated in National Police Regulation No. 10 of 2025, this represents, on the one hand, a small step forward in efforts to reform the National Police. Since the 2002 National Police Law was enacted and this list of 17 ministries and agencies was issued, there have been no detailed restrictions regarding the civilian positions that National Police members may hold. However, it is also essential to explain to the public the relevance of the specified positions and to establish restrictions on subsequent aspects—such as the maximum number of National Police members who can be assigned, limitations on the types of positions, and the duration of assignments—to prevent the migration of National Police members to the relevant ministries and agencies and to avoid undermining the career progression of civil servants within those ministries and agencies.
5. The government, as well as the National Police, need to be aware that National Police Regulation No. 10 of 2025 also has the potential to impact the National Police’s internal reform process. This is because, rather than strengthening the core professionalism of the National Police—such as democratic and modern policing, human rights-based law enforcement, and improving the quality of human resources—this list of 17 ministries and agencies could instead shift the institution’s focus toward expanding its institutional influence and could give rise to various conflicts of interest.
Contacts:
1. Ikhsan Yosarie, Human Rights and Security Sector Researcher at SETARA Institute
2. Azeem Marhendra Amedi, Legal and Constitutional Researcher at SETARA Institute