

Freedom of Religion/Belief Condition Report 2025

# Reorientation of State Policies and Actions

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## I. INTRODUCTION

2025 marked the first full year of the Prabowo-Gibran administration and constituted a crucial transitional period in the protection of freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) in Indonesia. This leadership transition gave rise to renewed hopes for the advancement of the tolerance ecosystem as well as broader protections for religious freedom and freedom of conscience in Indonesia. Nevertheless, SETARA Institute continued to document a number of deeply concerning incidents of violations against freedom of religion or belief throughout the course of 2025.

In this 2025 Freedom of Religion/Belief (FoRB) condition report, SETARA Institute presents a comprehensive account of all incidents and acts constituting violations of FoRB that occurred during the first year of President Prabowo-Gibran's administration. The report offers a detailed portrayal of the dynamics of the tolerance ecosystem in Indonesia, serving as a reference for policymakers at both the national and regional levels in the formulation of policies — particularly within the framework of the Government Work Plan (*Rencana Kerja Pemerintah/RKP*) and budgetary allocations through the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/APBN*). At the grassroots level, this report is designed to function as a

guiding framework for collaborative initiatives between civil society and government in advancing the tolerance ecosystem at the regional level, with the overarching aim of achieving an inclusive social order for all members of society.

## II. GENERAL FINDINGS


President Prabowo’s initial commitment to upholding tolerance is reflected in the 1<sup>st</sup> point of the Asta Cita, which affirms the protection of human rights, further elaborated in the 8<sup>th</sup> point with its specific emphasis on strengthening the commitment to tolerance. Beyond this, President Prabowo has explicitly declared Indonesia’s commitment to advancing interreligious tolerance at various international forums he has attended. Nevertheless, the state of FoRB in 2025 reveals a significant gap between the government’s normative commitments and their realization on the ground.

Broadly, the state of FoRB in 2025 confirms the persistence of serious violations and shows no significant improvement. Based on SETARA Institute’s documentation, the same categories of violations recorded in previous years continue to recur. A clear

indication that the state, through its government, has yet to demonstrate a genuine commitment to maintaining national stability through the preservation of interreligious tolerance. In other words, President Prabowo’s commitment to tolerance, frequently expressed at various international forums, has not been reflected in national policy practices. Moreover, the state continues to act as an enabler of FoRB violations through its discriminatory policies, further validating the assessment that it has yet to undertake a meaningful transformation from a perpetrator of religious freedom violations into a protector and guarantor of its citizens’ rights.

In this report, SETARA Institute documented 221 violation incidents, comprising 331 acts. While this figure represents a modest quantitative decline from the previous year, which saw 260 incidents and 402 acts in

*Graphic 1*  
*Incidents and Acts of FoRB Violations*  
*2024-2025*



2024, the scale of impact generated by FoRB violations in 2025 indicates that the state has yet to move decisively toward substantive progress. Of the total violations recorded in 2025, 128 were committed by state actors, compared to 197 perpetrated by non-state actors.

The number of cases has not yet shifted in the last 5 (five) years, which reflects the weak commitment and actualisation of the state's availability to protect the rights of the minority.

One of the key contextual triggers behind the consistently high number of FoRB violations over the past five years is the continued existence of discriminatory and intolerant regulations targeting minority groups, including Christian and Catholic communities as well as the Ahmadiyya congregation. These regulations are persistently maintained to restrict the space available to minority groups in practicing their religious teachings and rituals. Existing regulations also serve as instruments of legitimization for intolerant groups to carry out acts of discrimination.

Such situation is often compounded by the conduct of state apparatus who side with majority groups or opt to resolve disputes through informal 'reconciliation'. Rather than genuinely fostering harmony, a paradigm that prioritises order and social stability has led the state, through the actions of its apparatus, to impose a superficial form of 'reconciliation' that marginalises the rights of religious and belief minorities in favour of maintaining a semblance of conduciveness amid the dominance of certain majority religious groups.

The state's disregard for FoRB violations is further reflected in statements issued by key actors, such as the Minister of Religious Affairs, who previously characterized the intolerant and anarchic acts against the congregation of GKSI Padang Sarai as a mere misunderstanding. Such statements reveal the weakness of political leadership within the state apparatus in fulfilling the right to FoRB within Indonesia's

pluralistic order. Statements of this like constitute an oversimplification that legitimises acts of violence, further extending the distance between impacted people and their constitutional rights, rather than giving a normative signal to subordinate officials to address the situation appropriately. Should such responses continue to emerge in reaction to FoRB violations, they will constitute yet another instrument of legitimization for intolerant groups to engage in anarchic acts targeting minority communities. Consequently, aside from functioning as an enabler of FoRB violations, state actors had also contributed to the erosion of social leadership within society.


From the total of 128 acts of FoRB violations performed by state actors across 2025, majority of them originated from Regional Governments with 71 actions, followed by the Police with 15 acts, then by the National Armed Force (TNI), Prosecutors, and *Satpol PP* with each of them contributed 6 acts, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs with 5 acts.

Comparing them to the previous years, the number of cases recorded a marginal decline. However, this quantitative reduction does not necessarily reflect an improvement in the quality of FoRB protection. Substantively, a concentrated pattern of violations is evident, particularly in acts of discrimination and the prohibition or restriction of religiously-based economic activities. This concentration of patterns reflects the fact that the state, through its bureaucratic apparatus, continues to function as an actor in restrictive conduct toward certain community groups

Alongside state actors, FoRB violations were also committed by non-state actors in alarming numbers. SETARA Institute identified a shift in the predominant non-state perpetrators compared to 2024, which was dominated by civil society organizations (*organisasi kemasyarakatan/ormas*). In 2025, civilian groups emerged as the leading non-state perpetrators with 61

acts, followed by civil society organizations with 51 acts, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) with 23 acts, and religious figures, FKUB representatives, and individuals each accounting for 9 acts. The high number of civilian groups as violation actors suggests a growing tendency for conservative ideologies espoused by intolerant groups and organizations to take root at the grassroots level and manifest in everyday life.

*Graphic 2*  
*State and Non-State Actors Chart*




One case illustrating the phenomenon of FoRB violations perpetrated by civilians is the destruction of a Christian prayer house in Padang Sarai, West Sumatra. A group of residents carried out acts of destruction against the prayer house. Furthermore, the same residents engaged in anarchic conduct that resulted in injuries to juvenile victims. This incident demonstrates that FoRB violations do not merely manifest in the form of restrictions or rejection, but extend further to encompass violent extremism.


The situation depicted by these incidents reveals that non-state actors bear significant responsibility for FoRB violations in Indonesia. The tolerance of

intolerant practices at the local level, coupled with the state's lack of responsibility to combat intolerance and provide victims with justice, has led to the rise of civilian groups at the top of the list of non-state culprits. When acts of intolerance are left unaddressed, they undergo a metamorphosis into violent conduct with life-threatening consequences. The tolerance-strengthening objective expressed in the 8<sup>th</sup> Asta Cita will be reduced to mere normative rhetoric devoid of concrete realisation if this scenario continues without measured and intentional intervention, serving as a stark warning for social stability and national cohesion.

*Graphic 3*  
*State Actors with Most Violations*



*Graphic 4*  
*Non-State Actors with Most Violations*



Beyond illustrating how citizens can commit extreme FoRB violations, the attack in Padang Sarai simultaneously underscores a fundamental state failure — namely, the failure to protect the constitutional rights of citizens through the provision of religious education for students in accordance with their respective religion or belief. The violence in Padang Sarai reveals that children from religious minority groups have been deprived of their right to religious education on two separate counts. First, these youngsters were forced to

seek religious instruction through unofficial religious activities when the state failed to provide sufficient religious education through regular educational institutions like schools. Second, when intolerant groups' anarchic behaviour once more denied access to places for religious education and growth. As a result, FoRB violations in these situations have two consequences: they not only violate religious freedom but also make it more difficult for children to be protected and their right to religious education to be realised.

### III. INCIDENT TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS

Not unlike previous years, the state of FoRB in Indonesia throughout 2025 continues to reflect a range of issues that have yet to be comprehensively addressed, further exacerbated by the persistence of discriminatory regulations that serve as validation for intolerant groups to commit acts of violation. In this report, SETARA Institute identifies three key highlights of FoRB violations that were particularly prominent throughout 2025.

- 1) **The growing contribution of non-state actors to FoRB violations.** High number of violations committed by non-state actors indicates that FoRB violations do not solely arise from structural violations by state apparatus and governmental institutions, but have undergone a process of normalisation at the grassroots level. FoRB violations perpetrated by non-state actors occur across a relatively broad spectrum, ranging from soft acts such as intolerance to hard acts such as violent extremism.

When considered against the backdrop of Indonesia's feudal social setting, this reflects the failure of state apparatus to sever the chain of intolerance at the grassroots level. The absence of preventive measures and consistent law enforcement not only constitutes

a regression in FoRB protection, but also shapes the perspective of grassroots communities that all forms of intolerance directed at minority groups are tolerable acts.

The forced dispersal of a religious retreat in Cidahu, Sukabumi Regency, West Java, and the attack on a Christian prayer house in Padang Sarai, West Sumatra, stand as concrete manifestations of intolerance that has been internalized within social life. The violent acts committed by gangs of locals show how religious passion can easily turn into hazardous and anarchic behaviour. Children were among the victims of community violence in these cases, demonstrating that FoRB violations in the form of anarchism also have unintended repercussions, such as depriving vulnerable groups of their right to security. These facts once again underscore the state's indifference in guaranteeing the constitutional rights of vulnerable groups.

The high number of civilian perpetrators also indicates the continued weakness of social nodes as pillars of leadership sustaining the tolerance ecosystem. The dynamics of civil society, which has actively pursued various initiatives and progressive efforts in maintaining harmony, are

nonetheless confronted by the challenge of growing conservatism accompanied by the strengthening of citizens' coercive capacities. As a result, the social fabric that ought to serve as a reformist force in preserving harmony is instead weakened, rendering the pillars of social leadership increasingly fragile.

- 2) **The perpetuation of discrimination against the Ahmadiyya Muslim congregations.** Based on SETARA Institute's documentation throughout 2025, recorded violations against the Ahmadiyya Indonesia congregation increased from 8 cases in the previous year to 12 cases in 2025. Dominant cases emerging in 2025 include those pertaining to the conduct of the Jalsah Salanah, held simultaneously across various regions, as well as the cancellation of a book discussion on Ahmadiyya. Such cases demonstrate that restrictions and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya Indonesia congregation are recurring in nature and widespread across multiple regions.

The government's adoption of the MUI fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya as deviants as a formal point of reference constitutes one of the fundamental errors driving violations committed by state authorities at both the national and regional levels. As a state governed by the rule of law, Indonesia ought to refer to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the body of positive legislation in force within the country.

On the matter of legitimate bases for laws and regulations, the government must refer to the official laws and regulations hierarchy in Indonesia. The hierarchy, which is stipulated in Article 7 (1) of the Law No. 12/2011, places the 1945 Constitution as the highest law. Below the Constitution, there are (in sequence) the People's Consultative Assembly's Decrees (Tap MPR), the Law/the Government Regulation in lieu of Law, the Government

Regulation, the Presidential Regulation, and Provincial Regional Regulation, and the City/Regency Regional Regulation.

In the context of legislation, the government has committed three fundamental errors. *Firstly*, adopting the MUI fatwa as a legal basis is an action the state ought not to take. A fatwa constitutes a religious opinion guaranteed by the Constitution as an expression of freedom of speech and opinion. Nevertheless, as a Pancasila-based republic rather than a theocratic state, no religious opinion is binding upon the state as a mandatory point of reference.

*Secondly*, issuing the 2008 Joint Decree (SKB) in contravention of constitutional guarantees. Article 29 (2) of the 1945 Constitution affirms that the state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace their own religion and to worship in accordance with their religion and belief. SKB, that was signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General, the state prohibited religious activities by the Ahmadiyya Indonesia congregation (JAI), an act that is substantively incompatible with the Constitution. Pursuant to the legal principle of *Lex Superiori Derogat Legi Inferiori*, whereby a higher-order regulation supersedes a lower-order regulation within the legislative hierarchy, the SKB ought to be set aside as it conflicts with the 1945 Constitution as the supreme law of the land. Furthermore, even where limitations on rights are recognised under human rights doctrine, such limitations must be enacted through legislation of general applicability — not regulations targeting Ahmadiyya exclusively.


*Third*, permitting excessive regulation through various regional prohibitions against Ahmadiyya, particularly in West Java. West Java Governor Regulation No. 12 of 2011 imposes prohibition

of Ahmadiyya Indonesia congregation activities within the territory of West Java. This gubernatorial regulation prohibits the dissemination, interpretation, and activities deemed to deviate from the core tenets of Islam, encompassing the use of Ahmadiyya attributes, signboards, and the propagation of its teachings in both oral and written forms. Such regulation has subsequently triggered a proliferation of analogous regulations at the regency and city levels. Although the legal basis explicitly cited in these regional regulations

is the SKB, the scope of Ahmadiyya prohibitions contained therein extends considerably beyond what is expressly stipulated in the SKB.

Fundamental errors regarding Ahmadiyya have fostered a broad range of FoRB violations against the congregation, spanning intolerance and hate speech to outright persecution. Such phenomena have similarly been observed and documented by SETARA Institute among other FoRB violations across 2025.

*Graphic 5  
4 Years of Violations against Ahmadiyya*



3) **The weak commitment to resolving FoRB violation cases against Christian communities.** Despite a marginal decline in the number of violations against Christian and Catholic communities, these groups remain the most frequent victims of intolerance throughout 2025. The number of violations continues to reflect a deeply concerning figure, indicating that the challenges faced by

Christian and Catholic communities are not merely incidental in nature, but rather structural in character. The quantitative decrease in cases does not by itself indicate an increase in the quality of protection; rather, it highlights how consistently they are victims, a trend that needs to be taken seriously in order to pinpoint the underlying cause of the issue, which is unresolved systemic instability.

Majority of violations against Christian and Catholic communities throughout 2025 continued to center on the establishment and use of houses of worship. Houses of worship remain the primary locus of contestation at the local level, where community rejection, social pressure, and the forced cessation of religious activities are recurrent occurrences. This illustrates that houses of worship, both as religious symbols and as centers of religious activity, are perceived as a threat by majority groups in certain regions.


This situation is inseparable from the regulatory challenges surrounding the establishment of houses of worship, which contain requirements that significantly narrow the space available to minority groups in conducting their religious lives. The adverse consequences of the Joint Ministerial Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs (PBM) Numbers 9 and 8 of 2006, long disregarded by the government,

continue to represent a persistent nightmare for religious minority groups. In practice, this regulation is frequently exploited as administrative legitimization to delay, restrict, or altogether prevent the establishment of houses of worship, thereby prolonging cycles of conflict and discrimination.


Should there be no effort to evaluate such problematic regulatory structure, issues on houses of worship would continue to become controversies in the governance of diversity in Indonesia.

Minority groups will always have little negotiating power when it comes to the establishment of places of worship since the state is shifting away from regulatory change. In this situation, local social dynamics will have a greater influence on the safeguarding of freedom of religion and belief than the universal and non-discriminatory principles of constitutional rights. To put it another way, when it comes to deciding what happens to minority groups, the state will once again represent the majority group.

*Graphic 6  
State's Violations Against Houses of Worship*



*Graphic 7*  
*Non-State Actors' Violations against Houses of Worship*




#### IV. ACTS OF VIOLATIONS AGAINST FORB


Throughout 2025, the six most prevalent FoRB violations committed by state actors were discrimination (33 acts), prohibition of business activities (26 acts), prohibition of religious activities (16 acts), religious defamation (8 acts), prohibition of house of worship construction (7 acts), and discriminatory policy (5 acts).

The six most prevalent FoRB violations committed by non-state actors, meanwhile, encompassed intolerance (51 acts), rejection of house of worship establishment (36 acts), restriction of religious activities (26 acts), religious defamation (14 acts), intimidation (7 acts), and prohibition of business activities (7 acts).

*Graphic 8*  
*State's Acts of Violation*



*Graphic 9*  
*Non-State Actors' Acts of Violation*



## V. VICTIMS OF VIOLATIONS

Throughout 2025, SETARA Institute recorded a total of 239 victims of FoRB violations in Indonesia. Of this figure, Christian and Catholic communities ranked highest with 61 victims, followed by civilian residents (41 victims), individuals (34 victims), and business actors (32 victims). Meanwhile, Muslims accounted for 15 victims, Ahmadiyya 12 victims, and religious figures 10 victims. These figures indicate that FoRB violations do not exclusively target specific religious or belief groups; rather, their adverse impact is more broadly felt by the general public, and extends further into the economic sphere, where business actors also sustain losses as a result of social pressure and discriminatory policies rooted in favoritism. Accordingly, the spectrum<sup>7</sup> of FoRB violations has moved beyond the private sphere,


reaching further into the social and economic domains.

The dominance of Christian and Catholic communities as the group with the highest number of victims reinforces prior findings regarding the challenges surrounding house of worship establishment and social resistance toward minority groups. Nevertheless, the high number of victims in the categories of civilian residents, individuals, and business actors also reflects an increasingly widespread pattern of vulnerability that is not confined to those affiliated with particular religious institutions. FoRB violations now extend to individuals in their daily lives and within social relations.

In several incidents, FoRB violations have escalated into violence rooted in power relations and

majoritarianism. The death of an elementary school student in Indragiri Hulu, Riau, allegedly a victim of bullying and physical violence on account of their religious difference, serves as a concrete illustration of majoritarianism's transformation into lethal physical violence. This case demonstrates that intolerance does not stop at social rejection or discrimination, but can escalate into acts of violence targeting the most vulnerable group: children. This shall be a stark warning to the government that FoRB violations constitute a serious problem which, if not addressed appropriately, will have profound implications for the social stability of the nation.

*Graphic 10  
Victims of Violations*



## VI. SPREAD OF REGION

Not unlike the previous years, West Java is still the region with the highest number of FoRB violations throughout 2025, with a total of 56 acts. Then, Aceh followed suit with 23 acts, East Java with 18, Central Java with 13, and DKI Jakarta with 12 acts.

West Java's sustained dominance as the region with the highest number of violations over several consecutive years indicates that the problem of intolerance has yet to undergo meaningful remediation, despite the emergence of dialogue initiatives and progressive policies in recent times. This fact shows that neither national nor regional policy measures have been able to effectively address the issues facing FoRB in Indonesia. The possibility of repeated FoRB violations will continue if diversity governance at the local level is not assessed. Within West Java itself, discriminatory regional regulations continue to be identified, including those that explicitly restrict the space available to minority groups, such as West Java Governor Regulation No. 12 of 2011 on the Prohibition of Ahmadiyya Indonesia Congregation Activities, further entrenching a normative ecosystem that is permissive toward discriminatory practices.

Besides the regulatory aspect, the rise of intolerant groups trying to uphold majoritarian norms is another factor contributing to West Java's ranking as the region with the most FoRB infractions. The HKBP Cikarang congregation's experiences with intimidation, persecution, and rejection of worship when trying to hold religious services serve as hard proof that social pressure plays a major role in limiting the rights of minority groups. In addition to reflecting resistance based on religious identification, this episode highlights the fact that other groups' access to places of worship can be restricted by majoritarian power dynamics.

Aceh's position as the second province with the


highest number of FoRB violations in 2025 cannot be separated from the context of its special legal status and socio-religious dynamics. The case of a blasphemy report filed against a young TikTok user demonstrates that digital spaces are not immune from religion-based criminalization. Additionally, the rejection of a band concert, which impacted business actors, and the local government's restriction of celebrations deemed incompatible with Islamic law also emerged as significant points of concern. This series of incidents once again serves as a strong indication that intolerance does not solely affect the domain of personal spirituality, but extends more broadly to the economic dynamics of citizens

Alongside Aceh, criminalisation on the grounds of blasphemy which happened in Malang City, East Java, is one of the factors that causes East Java to be placed at 3<sup>rd</sup> with the most FoRB violations.

The prevalence of blasphemy cases indicates that the government, through its existing regulations, has yet to be fully receptive to the diversity of religious expression, including varied interpretations of and perspectives on religious teachings. Blasphemy provisions continue to be employed as instruments of social control to suppress viewpoints that deviate from the mainstream. Rather than being managed through moderate spaces of dialogue and encounter, differences become easy targets for criminalization by majority groups. Such practices reflect a tendency to transform theological disputes into legal matters, which in turn heightens the likelihood of intimidation, stigmatization, and polarization within society.

On the other hand, the revision of the Criminal Code (KUHP), which modifies the blasphemy provisions into regulations concerning incitement to violence against

Graphic 11  
Violations per Region



religion (Article 300), may be viewed as a normative advancement worthy of attention. Conceptually, this amendment shifts the focus from the protection of 'religion' as an abstract concept toward the protection of individuals from acts of provocation that may culminate in violence. If implemented with care and in accordance with the principle of strict limitation, this provision carries the potential to reduce the criminalization of differing interpretations or expressions of belief. Accordingly, there exists a possibility that the trend of invoking blasphemy provisions in recent years may decline in the future, provided that law enforcement agencies no longer apply a repressive approach toward legitimate religious expression.

Over the first year of the Prabowo-Gibran administration, no significant measures have been taken to protect FoRB at the national level. Through the end of 2025, the Draft Presidential Regulation on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony (*Rancangan Peraturan Presiden tentang Pemeliharaan Kerukunan*

*Umat Beragama/Raperpres PKUB*), as a revision of the PBM containing discriminatory provisions, remains mired in a non-transparent process, with no clear indication of its substantive direction or continuity.

The absence of progressive legislation at the national level to guarantee citizens' right to FoRB reflects a tangible stagnation at the level of strategic policymaking. In other words, no national-level response has yet been formulated to address the recurring violations at the regional level. This stands in stark contrast to developments at the regional level, where affirmative efforts by local governments to advance diversity governance and dialogue initiatives have begun to emerge.

Despite the ongoing challenges confronting the state of FoRB in Indonesia, SETARA Institute also documented a number of promising initiatives undertaken by regional governments throughout 2025 to strengthen the tolerance ecosystem. The enactment of Regional Regulation (*Peraturan Daerah/Perda*) of Tanah

Laut Regency Number 1 of 2025 on the Organization of Tolerance in Community Life serves as evidence of the local government's commitment and dedication to guaranteeing the rights of religious minority groups through an affirmative regulatory approach. Similarly, the Bandung City Regional Regulation Number 13 of 2025 on the Organization of Tolerance in Community Life constitutes a noteworthy best practice, embedding the principles of equality, non-discrimination, and protection of vulnerable groups as integral components of local governmental responsibility.

Although FoRB protection has stagnated at the national level, the space for policy innovation at the local level is still open and has the potential to serve as a model for more inclusive community governance, as evidenced by the emergence of progressive legal instruments across various regions. However, local governments' dedication, execution, and oversight are crucial to these policies' efficacy. These areas for innovation will eventually amount to nothing more than regulatory symbolism if creative regulations are not accompanied by thorough end-to-end monitoring and oversight.

From a legal perspective, the challenges to FoRB in Indonesia currently reside not only in the dimension of legal substance, but also in legal culture and legal structure. With respect to legal substance, existing regulations remain anchored in longstanding and problematic frameworks that afford the majority the capacity to exercise control over minority groups. In terms of legal structure, the consistency of law enforcement by executive apparatus, legislative resolve to undertake regulatory revision, and the issuance of progressive judicial decisions have yet to demonstrate systematic improvement. In the legal culture dimension, on the other hand, social pressure and the manifestation of majoritarianism demonstrate a notably powerful coercive capacity among citizens in influencing

governmental decisions.

Should this situation persist without intervention from the central government, the challenges of diversity in Indonesia will solidify into a structural problem with the potential to impede long-term social stability. The state of FoRB in Indonesia will continue to deteriorate over the next five years.

In this context, a fundamental reorientation is required in the formulation of state policies and actions, one that is more consonant with the State Ideology of Pancasila as the common ground, foundational pillar, and ultimate direction of the Indonesian state and nation, as well as with the Constitution, which provides constitutional guarantees for a range of rights, including the right to FoRB, for all elements of Indonesia's diversity, whether quantitatively numerous or few.

This reorientation is urgent in light of data reflecting the persistently high level of FoRB violations in Indonesia. Since 2007, the first year in which SETARA Institute began documenting FoRB violations in Indonesia, a total of 3,823 incidents comprising 5,639 acts have been recorded. This translates to an average of 201.2 FoRB violation incidents per year, and 3.9 incidents and 5.7 acts of FoRB violations per week. In order to give the progressive actions implemented by regional governments, especially municipalities throughout Indonesia, legal legitimacy and harmonisation (legal alignment), such reorientation is equally necessary.

A myriad FoRB violations against religious and belief minority groups in Indonesia must be read by the Government as a weakening of the social capital underpinning national development. Constitutional guarantees of FoRB must not be erroneously viewed through the lens of political stability, as though the religious and belief expressions of minority groups constitute a threat to stability that must be suppressed through the coercive power of the state and society in

the name of the majority. The aspiration stipulated in the Proclamation State is to make Indonesia ‘a state of all for one, a state of one for all, and a state of all for all.’ In this context, every citizen must be regarded as an equal stakeholder in Indonesian nationhood and must receive equal benefit from it. To realize this Proclamation State ideal, state apparatus and government must distance themselves from a foundational disposition of favoritism that privileges certain citizens above others, and that grants special treatment to one group of citizens over another.

## VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The President is urged to demonstrate firm and unequivocal leadership in guaranteeing the right to FoRB for all citizens, in strict accordance with the constitutional guarantees enshrined in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
2. The President is recommended to accelerate the drafting of the Presidential Regulation on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony (PKUB) as a replacement for the 2006 PBM, with due assurance that its substantive provisions serve to strengthen rights guarantees rather than to preserve mechanisms of social veto against religious and belief minority groups.
3. The President is called upon to initiate a comprehensive review and revocation of all existing regulations at both the national and regional levels that are discriminatory in nature and unduly restrict the space available to religious minority groups in Indonesia, including the Ahmadiyya congregation and other minority communities.
4. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is recommended to establish early detection mechanisms and preventive intervention frameworks to address religion-based violence, with particular emphasis on educational environments.
5. Law enforcement agencies are urged to apply consistent, impartial, and non-selective enforcement measures against all perpetrators of religion-based violence.
6. The Government is called upon to guarantee the protection of academic spaces from practices of silencing and activity cancellation perpetrated by particular community groups, as such cancellations constitute a violation of academic freedom and are fundamentally incompatible with the principles of a law-governed state.
7. The House of Representatives (DPR) and Regional Legislative Councils (DPRD) are recommended to actively promote the harmonization of remaining discriminatory regulations and to ensure that all legislative formation processes adhere to the principle of non-discrimination. []